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RECENT BOOKS 
BooK REVIEWS 
MARRIAGE STABILITY, D1voRCE, AND THE LAw. By Max Rhein-
stein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1972. Pp. xi, 482. $17.50. 
Review I 
The final conclusion of this almost definitive study of marriage 
and divorce by a world-renowned scholar of comparative law comes 
to this: "Laws tending to make divorce difficult should not be con-
sidered" as one of the effective tools "[£]or the strengthening of mar-
riage stability" (p. 443). Dr. Rheinstein, Professor Emeritus of the 
Law School faculty at the University of Chicago, concludes that it 
is not the legal institutions of a culture that make marriage stable 
but rather "family counseling and family life education" (p. 443). 
Through a fascinating review of marriage and divorce in the cul-
tural context of Japan, Sweden, Italy, France, the Soviet Union, and 
America, Professor Rheinstein illustrates and demonstrates the valid-
ity of his conclusion. The findings of this very important study will 
undoubtedly have a very strong impact both in the thirty American 
jurisdictions where divorce is possible after a certain period of sepa-
ration without investigation of fault as well as in the remaining 
twenty jurisdictions in the United States that follow the traditional 
pattern of allowing divorce on the usual grounds of adultery, deser-
tion, or cruelty. Professor Rheinstein would be the first to admit, 
however, that since he is, as he notes, "neither a statistician nor a 
sociologist," his findings on the inefficacy of laws in stabilizing the 
institution of marriage should not be taken as the very last word. 
Professor Rheinstein's extensive chapter on marriage and divorce 
in Japan suggests that even though divorce is available in that nation 
by unilateral or mutual consent, the rate of divorce per one thou-
sand population has consistently been about one third the rate of 
the United States. Similarly, in Sweden there are generally few, if 
any, legal inhibitions to separation. Yet, the rate of marriage termi-
nation remains lower than the divorce rate in America. Italy is, of 
course, a special case since divorce was not possible there until De-
cember 1, 1970, and, even after that date, the divorce rate is still 
practically zero. Professor Rheinstein's study indicates that about 
one million inhabitants of Italy live in so-called irregular unions, 
while some two and a half million persons exist in a "separated" 
status. Assuming that these statistics are relatively accurate, it follows 
that despite the absence of divorce in Italy, the rate of separation is 
0.70 per one thousand population-a rate of marriage breakdown 
equal to that in France or in Great Britain! 
[ 604] 
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Professor Rheinstein's chapter on marriage and divorce in the 
Soviet Union recounts the dramatic changes in public law that have 
characterized the Soviet Union since 1917. In 1965, the last year 
under the restrictive divorce law, the divorce rate for the Soviet 
Union was I.7 per one thousand population. In 1966, however, the 
divorce rate jumped to 3.1 per one thousand population-that is, 
about 25 per cent above the 2.5 per one thousand population figure 
in the United States (p. 243). The Russian divorce rate has descended 
somewhat in more recent years, but Professor Rheinstein's book does 
not contain any evaluation of Russian divorce practices since 1966. 
After a comprehensive review of the evolution of divorce law 
in the United States, Professor Rheinstein poses the question that 
confronts him and every jurist: 
If we regard family stability as a social good, a situation of high 
incidence of marriage breakdown constitutes a social evil. Its reduc-
tion deserves to be an aim of social policy. But what about divorce? 
It does not occur by itself but only as a sequel of marriage break-
down. Insofar as divorce opens the door to legitimate remarriage 
and thus to the creation of new homes free of any taint of illegiti-
macy, it is a social good rather than an evil. But if the easy avail-
ability of divorce is conducive toward a high incidence of marriage 
breakdown, good social policy requires that the incidence of divorce 
ought also to be reduced. Is it? [P. 276.] 
Professor Rheinstein's response to that inquiry demonstrates the 
frailty of any law that attempts to restrict or inhibit a permanent 
separation of spouses when a generation or a culture overwhelmingly 
approves of the permanent dissolution of a union that has turned 
out to be unsatisfactory. A comprehensive table of the rate of di-
vorces per one thousand population (Table 21, p. 312) reveals that 
the United States, with a rate of 2.6 in 1950 and a rate of 2.4 in 1966, 
generally had the highest rate of divorce of any of the nations sur-
veyed.1 The high divorce rate in the United States persists despite 
the fact that traditional American family law has always considered 
the contract of marriage to be "tripartite"-that is, the state is a 
third party to the marriage contract in the sense that the contract 
cannot be dissolved by agreement between spouses unless the state 
consents. 
Professor Rheinstein does not, however, in any way minimize the 
adverse social impact of widespread divorce. His last chapter, en-
titled "What To Do About Marriage Breakdown," seeks to respond 
to the various proposals for law reform that have been offered "to 
eliminate the measure of pain unnecessarily added by traditional 
I. Countries considered include Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, East and \\Test 
Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
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law to the suffering which is inevitable in every case of marriage 
breakup" (p. 406). Professor Rheinstein sets forth these conclusions: 
1. Although the median age at which people marry has dropped 
to about twenty years since the end of World War II, there is little 
if any evidence that the marriages of adolescents can be "perceptibly 
reduced by legal means" (p. 418). Furthermore, the "statutory estab-
lishment of short waiting periods to compel the parties to consider 
the fateful step at least for a few days" has been ineffective (p. 419). 
2. The author concludes that divorce rates among persons with 
lower education or lower income seem to be higher than the divorce 
rates among the more affluent and better-educated elements of so-
ciety. At the same time, Professor Rheinstein is skeptical about the 
effect upon family stability of the "family allowances," employed in 
thirty-eight countries, which are "motivated by a desire to reverse a 
declining trend in the birthrate or simply to encourage fertility" 
(p. 425). He does, however, recommend that research should be "un-
dertaken to find out whether the alleviation of economic conditions 
apt to produce tension between spouses promises to be an effective 
device in reducing the incidence of marriage breakdown" (p. 426). 
3. Professor Rheinstein concedes that a "major cause of mar-
riage breakdown seems to be the uncertainty about the role assigned 
to women in present-day American society" (p. 427). His treatment 
of this evolving and indeed exploding topic is, however, very dis-
appointing. In fact, he does not appear, in the few paragraphs de-
voted to this subject matter, to state very clearly the dilemmas and 
the demands quite properly being put fonvard by wives who under-
standably feel themselves shackled by a law of marriage fashioned 
and formulated by men in an earlier age when women were not even 
given an education, let alone equality in society or in their own 
marriage relationship. 
4. Professor Rheinstein's treatment of the proposal that trial 
marriage be permitted in order to cut down on the number of di-
vorces is also unsatisfactory. He does concede that frank recognition 
of trial marriage might "prevent the procreation of children in those 
120,000 cases a year in which a marriage is terminated within the 
first three years of its existence" (p. 432). Although the proposal for 
trial marriage is never fully explored in Professor Rheinstein's study, 
he notes that in 1969 a group of progressive family law reformers in 
Sweden concluded: 
The new legislation should as far as possible be neutral in its rela-
tionship to various forms of cohabitation and different moral ideas. 
Marriage has, and ought to have, a central place in family law, but 
one should attempt to see that the family legislation does not con-
tain any provisions which create unnecessary difficulties for, or bur-
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den upon, those who beget children or start a family without 
maJ.Tying. [P. 156.] 
For attorneys in America who have sought to "civilize" the pro-
cedures surrounding divorce in America, Professor Rheinstein's 
book may well be overwhelmingly discouraging. For the attorneys, 
professors, and judges, who have contributed over the past ten years 
to the growth of the Section of Family Law of the American Bar 
Association and its publication, the Family Law Quarterly, the chal-
lenge of Rheinstein's study is not to do less to modernize family law 
in America, but rather to take a more fundamental or even radical 
approach to what must be done. Radical steps are not, however, in-
compatible with continued efforts to establish conciliation divisions 
of family courts, procedures by which the children of divorce would 
be granted all of their rights, and other reforms designed to make 
divorce as painless as possible once the decision has been reached 
that a divorce is the least unsatisfactory resolution of marital discord. 
Professor Rheinstein's volume is indispensable for any lawyer or 
law-related professional working in family law in America. Only by 
comprehending the conclusions in this important work can all of us 
free ourselves from the common illusion that the law has a solution 
for the complex and agonizing problems of partners in a marriage 
that has turned out to be unstable and unsatisfactory. 
Review II 
Robert F. Drinan, 
Member of Congress, former 
Editor of the Family Law Quarterly, 
and former Chairman of the 
Section of Family Law of the ABA 
Within the past few years more than a dozen states have enacted 
major revisions of their divorce statutes.1 Some, like California, 
have eliminated the traditional grounds of adultery and mental 
cruelty and have replaced them with a single standard, "irremedi-
able breakdown of the marriage." Other states, like Texas, have re-
tained the standard causes, but have added a no-fault provision in 
one form or another. Still others, like New York, have revitalized the 
old separation ground by reducing the required period to one year. 
I. Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American Jurisdictions, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 179 
(1972). The Family Law Quarterly plans to publish a yearly summary of the statutory 
grounds for divorce in all the states, but the laws are being revised so quickly that any 
list will be unavoidably out of date soon after it is in print. 
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As more states revise their laws, there has been increasing pressure 
upon the remaining states to change. In 1970, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved model leg-
islation in which "irretrievable break.down" is the sole ground.2 
The American Bar Association has thus far refused to endorse the 
proposal,3 but whether or not the model legislation wins the un-
divided support of the organized bar, divorce reform is coming and 
it is coming quickly. 
In the midst of this change, there is a particular need for a book 
that traces the cultural and political history of divorce and points 
the way to intelligent revision of our laws. Professor Max Rhein-
stein' s Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law serves the first func-
tion well, but unfortunately falls short on the second. His book cul-
minates more than twenty-five years of work, which began in 1946 
when he was appointed to the Interprofessional Commission on Mar-
riage and Divorce. The Commission, sponsored by the American Bar 
Association, was charged with drafting "a model law that would 
stem the rising tide of divorce and restore the stability of the Ameri-
can home and family" (p. 261). Although the Commission never 
proposed a statute, it stimulated extensive research, much of it by 
Professor Rheinstein, into the effect of divorce laws on family stabil-
ity. 
Professor Rheinstein's perspective on this subject has changed 
markedly since 1946. When the Commission began its work, 
"[n]aively we took it for granted that the evil was divorce" (p. 262), 
but he is now convinced of "the ineffectiveness of a strict divorce 
law as a deterrent to family break.up and as a guarantee of family 
stability" (p. 254). He has concluded that "American divorce law is 
not perfect, that it may justly be called messy, but that it is by no 
means deplorable" (p. 5). His changed attitude reflects two basic ob-
servations, both of which are the recurring themes of his book. 
First, Professor Rheinstein states clearly what many people feel 
intuitively: it is marriage breakdown, not the legal formality of a 
divorce, that threatens families. When a divorce is finally granted, 
the spouses are long since separated, both physically and emotion-
ally. Trying to save marriages by restricting divorce is as futile as 
searching for a cure for rigor mortis. It is too late. All that we can 
do is provide a decent burial. Professor Rheinstein supports this con-
clusion in a lengthy examination of divorce laws, present and past, 
2. UNIFORM MAruuAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 302(a)(2). For the complete statute and 
comments, see 5 FAMILY LQ. 205 (1971). For an in-depth consideration of no-fault 
divorce, see M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE, scheduled for publication later this year. 
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 37, col. 2. The opponents of the statute, who criti• 
cized its drafting and particularly its provisions for spousal support, were suspected of 
self-interest. Many family law practitioners fear that "no-fault" somehow means "no 
lawyer." 
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in a variety of countries-Japan, Sweden, Italy, the Soviet Union, 
and others-as well as in a number of states in this country. He 
makes a persuasive case that marriage breakdown exists whether or 
not the legal formality of divorce is easily available. Moreover, he 
finds that where we have persisted in treating divorce as the evil, 
"[w]e have not only not succeeded in curbing marriage breakdown 
but have aggravated its impact and magnified its consequences" 
(p. 4). 
Professor Rheinstein's primary concern throughout the book is 
with the larger social forces that have shaped divorce law; thus he 
emphasizes institutions, such as the church, the legal profession, and 
the various branches of government, rather than individuals as they 
are personally touched by divorce.4 In the United States, he believes, 
"it is probable that the rate of marriage breakdown has indeed in-
creased, although we do not know how much" (p. 268),11 but he at-
tributes the increase to changing social factors6-emerging rights of 
women,7 industrialization, geographic mobility, and so forth-rather 
than to overly lenient divorce laws. The only hope that he sees for 
curbing marriage breakdown is in altering public attitudes about 
marriage through massive family education for the young and coun-
seling for those about to marry. Although he concedes that some sort 
of "trial marriage" might be more effective, he believes there is no 
chance for legislative action, so he mentions it only in passing.8 
Professor Rheinstein's second theme emerges from his observa-
tion that American divorce law constitutes a compromise: "A con-
4. For development of the personal aspects of marriage breakdown, see DIVORCE 
AND AFTER (P. Bohannan ed. 1970), particularly ch. 2, "The Six Stations of Divorce," 
and ch. IO, "Some Thoughts on Divorce Reform." 
5. It is easy enough to see that many marriages break up without ending in divorce, 
but there is no index by which the extent of marriage breakdown can be measured. 
Even when the definition of breakdown is arbitrarily limited to separations and deser-
tions (as it is by Professor Rheinstein), it is impossible to come up with reliable figures 
because court records are poor and there has been little tabulation. 
6. In this regard Professor Rheinstein has occasionally made overly broad statements 
that unnecessarily detract from an otherwise scholarly book. For instance, he states: 
"So the victims of progressive education take to flight into the escapist realms of drugs, 
sex, flower power, pacifism, extraparliamentary opposition, romanticism-realms in 
which lasting satisfaction is not to be found. The hard ways of discipline, self-restraint, 
acceptance of fate immutable by man, these solely effective ways to find satisfaction 
here on earth are disdained. If marital breakdown has indeed come to be more frequent 
than in the past, here seems to lie the principal cause" (p. 428). At another point, in 
arguing for expanded counseling services, he says: "The most useful service a concili-
ator can render is that of making clients realize that their marital difficulties have 
their roots in deepseated personality defects ••• " (p. 441). 
7. See Kay, Book Review, 60 CALIF. L REv. 1683 (1972). 
8. No state has come close to changing its marriage law in this way, but a bill was 
introduced in the Maryland legislature in 1971 that would have permitted a three-year 
"renewable" marriage. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1971, at 95, col. 3. As is often true, public 
mores may be ahead of the codified law, as more and more couples now live together 
without the formality of a legal marriage ceremony. 
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servative law of the books has been turned by the courts into a 
different law in action in which the ideas of liberalism are given an 
outlet of an often extreme character" (p. 29). In his zeal to point out 
that consent divorce is a "flourishing institution" in the United 
States, he minimizes the price we must pay for it. 
The conservatives are made happy by the strictness of the law of the 
books. Those who are liberal to the extent of seeking freedom of 
remarriage for themselves, are satisfied by the ease with which their 
desire is accommodated in practice. Those who are not directly con-
cerned as divorce seekers or protectors of the faith have little need 
for considering the problem at all. The only ones who feel troubled 
are those occasional academics who view with alarm the hypocrisy 
of the system, the light-hearted way in which perjuries are com-
mitted and condoned, and who fear for the integrity of the law and 
the respect in which the law and its priests should be held by the 
public. At one time I was a member of this band. With advancing 
age I have come not only to accept but to admire the compromise. 
[P. 254.]9 
It is hard to believe that "conservatives" who seriously support strict 
laws can be mollified by statutes that are often flouted by the courts. 
Likewise, the cost we pay for the compromise can hardly please many 
"liberals." Professor Rheinstein himself admits that in order to ob-
tain divorce, "[p]erjury may have to be committed, expensive travel 
may have to be undertaken, [ and] procedural safeguards against col-
lusion may have to be disregarded ... " (p. 251). Migratory divorce 
is too expensive, both in money and time, for most people. Those 
judges in Alabama, Missouri, New York, and other states, who have 
disciplined or disbarred lawyers for perjury or fraud, apparently do 
not take a "light-hearted" view of divorce proceedings.10 He also 
notes that some "attorneys of the legal aid societies ... have shied 
away from divorce cases in which clients or witnesses would have to 
perjure themselves" (p. 256). If this is correct, it reinforces the real 
dualism of our divorce law, namely, one rule for the rich and an-
other for the poor.11 
9. As Professor Rheinstein himself points out, he did not always see it this way, 
In 1953 he commented that the "discrepancy between the law of the books and the 
law in action, which we find in so many states, has, through its tolerance or promotion 
of collusive practices and perjury, developed into a serious threat to the morals of the 
bar and the respect for law among the public." Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and 
Divorce Law of Western Countries, 18 I.Aw 8e CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 19 (1953). 
IO. Fourteen Alabama lawyers surrendered their licenses to practice after a bar 
association investigation of "quickie" divorces. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1965, at 19, col. 6. 
A Missouri lawyer's license was removed for "coaching witnesses" and "collusion" in 
divorce cases. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1961, at 59, col. 4. A New York lawyer was dis-
ciplined for fraud in obtaining a Mexican divorce for a client, N.Y. Times, Jan, 6, 
1971, at 38, col. 1. 
11. For discussion of some of the ways in which divorce can be economically dis• 
criminatory, see Gold, The Poor and Divorce: Boddie v. Connecticut, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 
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Although he does analyze in detail a number of alternatives, 
Professor Rheinstein downplays the need for statutory reform be-
cause he feels that we have an acceptable consent system now. 
As far as marriage dissolution is concerned, for the majority of 
the states and especially for their metropolitan courts, adoption of 
the uniform. law [the "no-fault" statute proposed by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws] would mean 
hardly more than concordance of the law of the books with the law 
in action. As in the case of California, the major impact would be 
felt in the matters of child custody and of dollars-and-cents, and in 
the negotiations about these issues. [P. 387.] 
Recent experience in California, Colorado, Michigan, and other 
states has shmvn, however, that the passage of no-fault statutes affects 
more than simply custody and support. Even though California's old 
law had been interpreted liberally,12 the divorce rate jumped forty-
six per cent in 1970,13 the first year under the new Family Law Act.14 
There was a four per cent drop in 1971, but the number of divorces 
headed back up in the first six months of 1972. Opponents of no-
fault divorce point to such increases as proof that reform undermines 
family stability, while the new law's advocates claim it only shows 
that many unhappily married people have been unshackled from the 
hypocrisy and unfairness of the former system. No matter how they 
are interpreted, these statistics conclusively rebut Professor Rhein-
stein's contention that no-fault statutes merely revise the law of the 
books to coincide with the law as it is already practiced: if the 
change were only a formality, divorce rates before and after it would 
have remained substantially the same. 
281 (1969); Lichtenstein, New York's New Law and the Divorce Lawyer: Now the Poor 
Can Get Divorced, Too, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at SO. 
12. Professor Rheinstein points out that California judges "handled the old statute 
so that a divorce was hardly ever denied and thus the California divorce rate has been 
one of the highest in the nation. Nothing but the requirement of a minimum resi-
dence of one year in the state, and the delay produced by the interposition of an 
interlocutory decree, prevented California from being a competitor with Nevada" (p. 
373). For a description of California practice under the old statute, see Kay, A Family 
Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1205, 1212-20 (1968). 
13. California Dept. of Public Health, Release No. 10, Vital Statistics-Marriage 
and Divorces, Aug. 1972. There were 107,307 dissolutions in 1970, as compared to 
73,325 divorces in the previous year. See note 14 infra. The precise rate of increase 
depends on whether it is measured absolutely or per capita, but by either standard 
divorce has increased markedly under the new law. The number of petitions for 
divorce also rose, but only by 14.9 per cent. See Goddard, A Report on California's 
New Divorce Law: Progress and Problems, 7 FAMILY L.Q. -, - (1973). That the 
number of divorces rose much faster than the number of petitions in part reflects a 
reduction in the various waiting periods, but it also may indicate that once people 
institute a no-fault divorce action they are more likely to see it through. 
14. CAL. CIV. ConE §§ 4500-40 (West 1970). Under the new California law, divorce 
is called "dissolution." Although this term is now in wide use there, it is unfamiliar 
in most of the country, so the term divorce is used in this Review. 
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Several underlying reasons may be offered to explain why the 
new no-fault statute caused such a dramatic increase in the number 
of divorces in California. Some people, who knew their marriages 
had failed but did not want to go through an adversary proceeding 
no matter how enlightened it might be, apparently found a no-fault 
hearing more attractive. Other couples, who previously would have 
gone to Nevada, have discovered that it is easier to stay home; 
while the California divorce rate has been going up, the Nevada 
rate has plummeted.15 If this signals the death of migratory divorce, 
at least for Californians, it is good news for everybody except Reno 
lawyers. It is a costly and pointless ritual to require people to go 
out of state to formalize the death of their marriage. Finally, "matters 
of child custody and of dollars-and-cents" cannot be separated from 
the grounds for granting divorce. Under the fault system, the party 
more eager for divorce must often pay either in alimony (if it is the 
husband who wants a divorce he pays more, if it is the wife she re-
ceives less or none at all) or in child custody rights for his or her 
spouse's agreement not to contest. The reluctant spouse can drive 
a hard bargain by threatening to fight the divorce in court; a contest 
can prevent the divorce altogether or at least result in a punitive 
decree against the "guilty" spouse. In short, Professor Rheinstein 
errs in concluding that the fact that ninety per cent or more of the 
divorces in this country are ultimately uncontested provides evidence 
of a de facto consent system.16 If he is right, it is only in a narrow 
sense; we do not have divorce for the asking. Agreement to divorce 
does not come easily, and the possible burden of having to prove 
fault puts the parties in unequal negotiating positions. 
Because he does not recognize that no-fault legislation goes far 
beyond any "liberal" "compromise" that has evolved in the courts, 
Professor Rheinstein has likely failed to reassure those people who 
sincerely fear that such a radical change will undermine the insti-
tution of marriage. The evidence he offers to show that divorce laws 
have not bred divorce in the past might well have been equally con-
vincing with respect to the future impact of no-fault laws. But, by 
overlooking the significant impact of no-fault divorce, he has left 
himself open to the contention that the cases are distinguishable. 
Opponents of divorce reform will have to be persuaded that 
whatever risks reform bears are outweighed by its benefits. Those 
who are concerned that no-fault statutes will cause hasty divorce may 
be assuaged by provisions that require a reasonable waiting period 
or some sort of mandatory conciliation process, even if it is limited 
to informing both parties of the availability of marriage counseling 
15. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1971, at 59, col. 6. 
16. ''While not every uncontested divorce is collusive, it is always a consent di-
vorce except in those infrequent cases of ex parte divorce in which the defendant did 
not know of the proceedings and was thus unable to defend" (p. 247). 
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should they want it. People must learn that as little as we like di-
vorce, it is often the better of two unhappy alternatives. Likewise, 
we all must realize that divorce does not end the relationship be-
tween a husband and wife, it simply recasts it in a different form; 
this is especially true when there are children and substantial prop-
erty involved. That as many as one of every three divorce decrees is 
followed by still more litigation involving either custody or support 
indicates that we do too little to help people adjust to their new 
roles and responsibilities after they have been divorced.17 
In some ways the very strength of Professor Rheinstein's book 
may have contributed to its weaknesses. By focusing on the broader 
historical and cultural background of divorce, he seems to have over-
looked many of the unhappy aspects of everyday practice. American 
divorce law is indeed a compromise, but it is the worst of both 
worlds, not the best as he would have us believe. That Professor 
Rheinstein is overly sanguine about the current state of the law 
should not obscure the fact that his book is an important contribu-
tion to the literature of divorce, particularly in its comparison of 
practices in different societies. 
Michael Wheeler, 
Assistant Professor of Law, 
New England School of Law 
17. Westman &: Cline, Divorce Is a Family Affair, 5 FAMILY L.Q. I, 3 (1971). 
